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Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows 
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff ∗
I feel very honored to have been asked to deliver this year’s 
Timbers lecture, sponsored by the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth 
College and named in honor of William Timbers, a marvelous judge 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals.1  Before I went on the bench, I had the 
privilege of appearing many times before Judge Timbers.  He was 
very smart and very gracious.  Occasionally, he even ruled my way.  
That’s when I knew that he was getting old. 
I want to talk today about science and the law, and because my 
talk very much grows out of my own experiences on the bench, I will 
refer at times to some of the cases that have come before me.  But I 
want to make clear at the outset that nothing I say here is being said 
in my judicial capacity.  Accordingly, I will try to make my remarks as 
injudicious as possible. 
I start with what I think is obvious: science in all its forms—hard 
science, soft science, even so-called “junk” science—has in recent 
years invaded the courtroom to an unparalleled extent.  You probably 
already have a sense of this, whether from reading about DNA exon-
erations or from watching CSI on television.  But I see it in my court-
room in almost every case, whether it be in the latest chemical tests 
for detecting narcotics in drug cases, or in the innovative technology 
for swapping files in copyright cases, or in the developing psychiatric 
tests for determining post-traumatic stress in tort cases, or in the so-
phisticated use of regression analysis to calculate loss in securities 
cases.  The effects are often far-reaching.  In one case, I even con-
cluded that DNA testing had so exposed the imperfections of our le-
gal system that I had to declare the death penalty unconstitutional, 
since a meaningful number of people sentenced to death would 
 ∗ United States District Judge, Southern District of New York.  This speech was 
delivered to a lay audience on May 1, 2008, as the Timbers Lecture at Dartmouth 
College and is reprinted with the kind permission of the Rockefeller Center at Dart-
mouth College. 
 1 For biographical information on Judge William Timbers, see Federal Judicial 
Center, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow the “T” hyperlink; then 
follow the “Timbers, William Homer” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2008). 
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eventually be exonerated but it wouldn’t do them any good if they 
were already dead.2  That decision, however, was promptly re-
versed3—thus showing that, whatever else the determination of law 
may be, a science it isn’t. 
For judges, further evidence of how completely science has en-
tered the courtroom is this: although judges have manuals to help 
guide them on virtually every issue under the sun, it was not until 
1994 that a judges’ manual on scientific evidence first appeared.4  
But, within the space of a few years, 100,000 copies were distributed—
an unheard of number for a judges’ manual.  This meant in effect 
that not only every judge, but also every lawyer who had a case before 
a judge, wanted a copy.  Yet, by the year 2000, the manual was already 
outdated, and had to be revised, with new or substantially revised 
chapters on everything from epidemiology to toxicology to statistics 
to engineering to medicine, and so forth.5  Now, the 2000 second edi-
tion is itself in need of revision, and the committee of judges and sci-
entists who are overseeing the preparation of a third edition are con-
sidering expanding the manual to two volumes and adding several 
new areas of science to the mix.6
Like aliens from outer space, then, science has invaded the 
courtroom.  This is hardly surprising, given the increasing impor-
tance of science and technology in our society.  Nevertheless, judges 
frequently find it difficult, and sometimes bewildering, to come to 
grips with science in the courtroom. 
If you take a somewhat longer-term perspective, you notice that 
law and science have a kind of love/hate relationship that has led to 
difficulties over the course of many decades, if not centuries.  The 
“love” part of the love/hate relationship comes from the fact that the 
law is messy and therefore is attracted to the greater certainty that 
science seems to promise.  The “hate” part comes from the fact that 
the “science” that lawyers seek to introduce into the courtroom often 
proves to be unreliable. Let me elaborate: 
 2 United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 
49 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 3 Quinones, 313 F.3d at 59. 
 4 REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.ns
f/inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/93. 
 5 REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf. 
 6 While I have the privilege of serving on the committee revising the manual, 
nothing I say here is offered in that capacity.  These are merely my personal views. 
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In theory, the legal process resolves disputes by applying general 
legal principles to particular facts.  In many cases, it is not that diffi-
cult to figure out what the applicable legal principles are; the hard 
part is determining the facts.  Judges and juries must then function 
somewhat like detectives or historians, sifting through the available 
evidence to try to determine the truth.  They are aided in this en-
deavor by a refreshing ignorance of “postmodernism,” which would 
assure them that their endeavor is doomed.  They are aided even 
more by that brilliant Anglo-American invention, the adversary sys-
tem, in which each side to a dispute has a champion who points out 
all the flaws and shortcomings in the other side’s evidentiary submis-
sions, until the only remaining facts in which a judge or jury has con-
fidence are those that have survived searching scrutiny. 
But even then, judges and juries, not to mention outside observ-
ers, sense that the traditional means used to determine the facts in 
lawsuits—that is, eye-witness testimony, cross-examination, documen-
tary proof, and the like—are imperfect and uncertain and may lead 
to less than accurate findings of fact.  It was this perception that, cen-
turies ago, led the lawyers in England to attempt, by use of “demur-
rers,” to reduce every dispute to some narrow legal issue as to which 
the relevant facts would not make that much of a difference; but, of 
course, this only led to the kind of manipulation of legal niceties that 
even now gives lawyers a bad name. 
At the other extreme, it was the same desire for a foolproof 
method of determining the facts that led some medieval courts to 
make use of the so-called “ordeals.”  In the “ordeal by water,” for ex-
ample, a guilty person thrown into a river would be rejected by the 
pure waters and float, while an innocent person would be embraced 
by the pure waters and sink to the bottom.  To be sure, this method 
had its own downside: the innocent person might drown.  But, being 
pure, he would go to heaven and all would be well.  (And, in fact, he 
was usually rescued.) 
Another technique, popular in the late middle ages and early 
Renaissance, was torture.  But it was eventually rejected by most legal 
systems, not out of some soft-hearted sense of squeamishness, but be-
cause it didn’t work.  The torturee simply told the torturer what he 
thought the torturer wanted him to say.  Today, who would think of 
using torture to determine the truth? 
The point is that the uncertainties of legal fact-finding led peo-
ple to seek, often desperately, a surer way to find the truth.  And in 
modern life, the branch of knowledge most commonly associated 
with certainty is science.  Ironically, this so-called “positivist” view of 
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science is no longer shared by most scientists themselves, who are 
more comfortable these days with probabilities rather than certain-
ties.  But the public as a whole associates science with certainty, and 
therefore sees scientific methods and instruments as the best way to 
determine the truth. 
Regrettably, this faith in science as a tool for determining the 
truth can itself be manipulated.  A classic example is the so-called “lie 
detector,” the polygraph machine.  The polygraph first gained cur-
rency in the early 20th century because it was supposed to be a “scien-
tific,” and therefore reliable, way to determine whether a witness was 
lying or telling the truth.7
The reality, however, is that there is nothing remotely scientific 
about the polygraph.  The theory of the polygraph—itself largely un-
tested—is that someone who is consciously lying feels anxiety, and 
that the anxiety, in turn, is manifested by an increase in respiration, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and sweating.8  Common experience sug-
gests that there are a lot of possible flaws in this theory.  For example, 
it may be that more practiced liars feel little anxiety about lying.  It 
may be that taking a polygraph test may itself generate anxiety.  It 
may be that changes in sweating, pulse rate, blood pressure, and res-
piration rate are commonly brought about by all sorts of conditions, 
both external and internal, that may vary even while the witness is 
taking the test.  And so forth. 
At the same time, there may be some people who fit the theory.  
One might hypothesize, therefore, that polygraph tests might be bet-
ter than pure chance in separating truth-tellers from liars but would 
nevertheless have a high rate of error.  And that is precisely what the 
National Academy of Science, which in 2003 reviewed the evidence 
on polygraph reliability, concluded.9  The Academy also concluded 
that polygraph testing has weak scientific underpinnings and that 
“belief in its accuracy goes beyond what is justified by the evidence.”10
Not everyone agrees.  Reviewing the literature in 1998, the Su-
preme Court of the United States suggested that “the scientific com-
munity remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph 
techniques,”11 with some studies concluding that polygraphs are no 
 7 See generally Paul Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
848 (1939) (for the early history of the polygraph). 
 8 See id. 
 9 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 214 (2003), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10420#orgs. 
 10 Id. at 7. 
 11 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998). 
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better than chance at detecting lies and, at the other extreme, an-
other study concluding that polygraph results are accurate eighty-
seven percent of the time.12  But even a thirteen percent error rate is 
pretty high when you are dealing with something as important as de-
termining a witness’s credibility, let alone determining whether a per-
son is guilty or innocent of a crime. 
Moreover, all these error-rate statistics are suspect, because there 
is nothing remotely like agreement as to how one properly establishes 
the base measure for determining the reliability of the polygraph.  It 
is one thing to devise an experiment in which one set of subjects is 
told to lie and the other set of subjects is told to tell the truth, and 
quite something else to recreate the real-life conditions that would 
allow for a true test of the polygraph. 
Fortunately, most courts have never been persuaded that poly-
graph tests are sufficiently reliable to warrant admission of polygraph 
evidence in court.  As early as 1923, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia held polygraph evidence inadmis-
sible at trial,13 and this remains the view of every American jurisdic-
tion, state or federal—except New Mexico14 (don’t ask me why). 
But that has not stopped the government, the military, some pri-
vate industry, and much of the public generally from accepting the 
polygraph as reliable—so great is the desire for a “magic bullet” that 
can instantly distinguish truth from falsehood.  And this widespread 
belief in the efficacy of the polygraph has, ironically, become its chief 
justification, especially among law enforcement agencies.  The argu-
ment is that, whether or not the polygraph actually works, if people 
believe that it works it is a useful tool, because the subject will be mo-
tivated to tell the truth and “confess.”  As recently as March 22, 2008, 
The Wall Street Journal ran a long article on polygraphs in which vari-
ous apologists for polygraphs sought to justify it on these grounds.15  
And, more troubling, some recent judicial decisions have accepted 
this argument as a rationale for permitting use of polygraph testing 
by probation officers, who, in theory at least, are an arm of the judici-
ary. 
To me, however, this argument is—how can I put it—
hypocritical.  The argument, in effect, is that even if the truth is that 
polygraphs are unscientific and unreliable, we should, in the sup-
 12 Id. at 333. 
 13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 14 State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975) (later codified in N.M. 
R. EVID. §11–707). 
 15 Laurie P. Cohen, The Polygraph Paradox, WALL ST. J., March 22, 2008, at A1. 
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posed interest of truth, lie to people and encourage them to believe 
that polygraphs are scientific and accurate, because our lie will en-
courage people to tell us the truth. 
Nonetheless, for whatever reason, polygraph testing, though 
banned from direct admission to the courtroom, has increasingly 
crept into the legal process indirectly—where, I suggest, it has chiefly 
served to cause mischief.  An example from my own courtroom is il-
lustrative:16
The Millennium Hotel is situated right next to Ground Zero.  A 
few weeks after the attack on the Twin Towers, hotel employees were 
allowed back into the hotel to recover the belongings of the guests 
who had had to flee the premises on September 11.  One of the ho-
tel’s security guards reported to the FBI that he had found, in a safe 
in a room on the Fifty-first Floor occupied by a man named Abdullah 
Higazy, a copy of the Koran and a pilot’s radio of the kind used to 
guide planes from the ground.  The FBI quickly discovered that Hi-
gazy, though now an exchange student in the United States, was a for-
mer member of the Egyptian Air Force; but when they questioned 
him, he denied possession of the pilot’s radio supposedly found in his 
room.  Hypothesizing that Higazy was lying to cover up his use of the 
radio to guide the terrorist pilots to the Twin Towers, they arrested 
him and brought him before me on what is called a material witness 
warrant (which allows short-term detention of a witness who is other-
wise likely to flee).  At the hearing on whether Higazy should be de-
tained until he could testify before the grand jury investigating 9/11, 
Higazy repeatedly asked to be given a polygraph test to establish that 
the radio was not his.  I explained to him that polygraph tests were 
too unreliable to be admitted in court.  The federal prosecutor, for 
his part, expressed his own view that a polygraph test would be worth-
less in Higazy’s case because, the prosecutor claimed, a properly 
trained terrorist would know how to “beat” a polygraph test.  Never-
theless, after the hearing, Higazy, overruling his own lawyer’s advice, 
asked the FBI to give him a polygraph test, and the FBI agreed. 
The FBI brought Higazy, alone, into the polygraph testing room, 
explaining that his lawyer could not be present because it would up-
set the balance of this “delicate” test.  Over the next three hours, Hi-
gazy was repeatedly told by the FBI agent administering the test that 
he was not being truthful.  Finally, Higazy, by now hysterical, blurted 
out that maybe the radio really was his.  At that point, the FBI agent 
 16 For a detailed recital of the facts of the Higazy case, see Higazy v. Templeton, 
505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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stopped the test and told Higazy’s lawyer, who was waiting outside, 
that Higazy had “confessed” (i.e., confessed, at a minimum, to previ-
ously making false statements to the FBI, and maybe, inferentially, to 
aiding and abetting the attack on the Twin Towers, a capital offense).  
The next day, based on the prosecutor’s flat statement that Higazy 
had confessed to lying to the FBI, I ordered that Higazy be further 
detained without bail. 
On January 11, 2002, Higazy was formally charged with lying to 
the FBI.  Three days later, an American Airlines pilot walked into the 
Millennium Hotel and asked if he could get back the pilot’s radio he 
had left there on September 11th.  It quickly developed that the radio 
was, indeed, his; that the radio had never been in Higazy’s room or 
possession; and that the Millennium security guard had made up the 
whole story about finding the radio in Higazy’s room (apparently be-
cause he wanted revenge for 9/11 on anyone of Arab ancestry).  The 
Government dropped the charges against Higazy and prosecuted the 
security guard instead, who pled guilty.  Higazy also brought a civil 
suit against the FBI, which is currently pending before another judge.  
For my part, I ordered an investigation by the Government into the 
circumstances of the FBI’s polygraph testing, the result of which was a 
report assuring me that the manner and mode of Higazy’s polygraph 
examination was consistent with standard FBI practice.  I am not sure 
whether this meant that the FBI really believes in its polygraph re-
sults, despite their inaccuracy, or whether the FBI simply uses the fa-
cade of polygraph testing to try to elicit confessions.  Either way, I 
think that, but for a near miracle, Mr. Higazy would now likely be rot-
ting in prison or facing execution.  So much for the “science” of po-
lygraphy and its use in the legal process. 
At least, however, courts have been somewhat skeptical when it 
comes to polygraph testing and other devices that purport to “scien-
tifically” detect lying (the latest example being brain-scanning devices 
being marketed for this supposed purpose17). In the case of certain 
other kinds of purportedly scientific evidence, however, courts have 
sometimes proved quite credulous.  A well-known case involves psy-
choanalytic evidence.  In the middle of the twentieth century, in par-
ticular, American courts were persuaded that psychiatric evidence—
which at that time leaned heavily on psychoanalytic theory—had 
reached a level of scientific certainty sufficient to warrant its admissi-
 17 See Joel Garreau, Brain on Fire, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2006, at C01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/29/AR2006102 
900895_pf.html. 
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bility and use in a wide range of cases. 18  This mirrored a growing ac-
ceptance of psychoanalysis and psychiatry in the academy, and in 
“enlightened” society as a whole. 
The high-water mark of this development was the replacement 
of the traditional legal test for insanity with a more modern “scien-
tific” test.  The traditional test, which was first formalized in 1843 in 
an English case involving an attempted assassination of the British 
prime minister by a man named Daniel M’Naghten,19  was that some-
one was legally insane, in terms of criminal culpability, if he could not 
tell right from wrong.  But, in 1954, in another criminal case involv-
ing a man named Durham, a very respected American judge, David 
Bazelon, substituted a new test, quickly adopted by most U.S. courts 
(and still the law in many), which was that someone was legally insane 
if his criminal act was “the product of mental disease or mental de-
fect.”20
The “Durham” test assumed, among much else, that there was a 
scientific basis for defining, determining, and evaluating a mental 
disease or defect in the same way that one might define, determine, 
and evaluate if someone had a bad case of measles.  In practice, how-
ever, it quickly developed that in virtually every criminal case where 
the defense could produce a psychiatrist who would opine “to a rea-
sonable degree of scientific certainty” that the defendant’s miscon-
duct was a product of mental disease or defect, the prosecution could 
produce an equally well-credentialed psychiatrist who would opine, 
with equal scientific certainty, that the defendant was as sane as he 
could be.  When, following the attempted assassination of President 
Reagan in 1981, the would-be assassin, John Hinckley, was acquitted 
by reason of insanity as defined by the Durham test21, not only did 
several jurisdictions completely abolish the insanity defense alto-
gether,22 but also some very respected law professors and judges be-
gan to question whether the Durham test—in yielding broad author-
ity to psychiatrists to determine moral culpability—was mistaking 
 18 For a mid-twentieth century look at the use of psychiatric evidence in Califor-
nia criminal trials, see Leonard Dieden & Chris Gasparich, Pyschiatic Evidence and Full 
Disclosure at the Criminal Trial, 52 CAL. L. REV. 543 (1964). 
 19 Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Clark & Finelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
 20 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 21 For more on the backlash following the Hinckley acquittal, see HENRY J. 
STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 
(1993). 
 22 Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah have abolished the insanity defense.  IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §18-207 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-3220 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§46-
14-102, 46-14-311 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-305 (2003). 
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theories and hunches for genuinely scientific results.  Yet, despite 
these reservations, courts, in a host of situations (involving not just 
criminal culpability but determinations of competency, causation, in-
jury, remedy, and much more) were left with little choice but to ad-
mit psychiatric testimony in both civil and criminal cases. 
The courts’ conflicting attitudes toward psychiatric testimony 
mirrored a growing tension between their increasing skepticism 
about what was being offered in the courts as scientific evidence and 
their recognition that science was playing an ever greater role in the 
activities that found their way into the courts.  For courts, then, the 
immediate problem was how to keep pseudo-science out of the court-
room while letting real science in.  The traditional solution—let al-
most anything in that called itself science, and then let the jury de-
cide what credit to give it—seemed in practice to be imposing a 
burden on juries they could not easily undertake, and in some cases 
seemed tantamount to defrauding the jurors.  On the other hand, 
the role of the jury as finder of fact, hallowed by our constitution and 
deeply embedded in our notions of democracy, was not to be cava-
lierly cabined. 
In 1993, in a case called Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,23 the Supreme Court of the United States squarely confronted 
this problem head on.  Daubert was a so-called “toxic tort” case raising 
the issue of whether a drug called Bendectin caused birth defects if 
taken during pregnancy; but the court treated it as an opportunity to 
create a broad new role for federal judges: to act as gatekeepers who 
would permit into evidence only such science as passed certain basic 
tests. 
As now codified in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a 
qualified expert can testify as to scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge only if a judge first determines that “(1) the testi-
mony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”24  
Plainly, this rule is far from self-executing.  What are “sufficient” facts 
or data?  What are “reliable” principles and methods?  But, broadly 
speaking, what the rule is asking judges to do, so far as scientific evi-
dence is concerned, is to make sure that the proffered evidence is, in 
the words of the Supreme Court, “ground[ed] in the methods and 
procedures of science.”25
 23 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 24 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 25 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
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The Supreme Court, moreover, had a particular view of what 
those methods were, for it described four criteria that would normally 
have to be satisfied before the methods could qualify as “scientific,” 
viz., that the methods resulted in testable predictions, that they had 
been the subject of peer review, that they had a known error rate, and 
that they were generally accepted in the scientific community.26  Stu-
dents of the philosophy of science will immediately recognize that 
most of these criteria, especially the requirement that the methods 
yield predictions that can be tested, i.e., falsified, reflect the views of 
the twentieth-century Austrian philosopher Karl Popper, who, when 
most of the current Supreme Court judges went to college, was con-
sidered the final authority on scientific method.27  The chief addition 
to the Popperian approach is the requirement of a “known error 
rate,” 28 which reflects the currently prevailing view that scientific 
truth is a matter of probabilities, not certainties. 
This is all very well in the abstract; but applying it in practice in 
an actual legal case is not so easy.  Let me give you an example from 
one of my own cases, the so-called Ephedra Litigation that is now 
completed in all aspects that relate to my talk here today.29  By way of 
background, ephedra is a plant substance, now largely banned by the 
Food and Drug Administration, that, prior to the ban, was combined 
with caffeine and then marketed as a “natural” way of achieving 
weight loss, increased energy, and improved athletic performance.  
So far as I know, Roger Clemens never took ephedra; but, prior to its 
ban, several million people did, and some of them shortly thereafter 
suffered strokes and heart attacks.  More than 800 lawsuits were 
brought throughout the United States by the victims or their estates, 
alleging that ephedra was the cause of these strokes and heart attacks, 
and, through the operation of several procedural laws, these cases 
were all consolidated into one big case assigned to me.30  This is not 
something for which one volunteers; but I have to say it was a fasci-
nating case. 
The key issue, as you might expect, was whether I would allow 
the plaintiffs’ experts to testify that ephedra had caused the victims’ 
strokes and heart attacks.  Now, causation in an ordinary personal in-
 26 Id. at 592–94. 
 27 For a brief summary of Karl Popper’s biography, see Philosophers: Karl Pop-
per, http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/phil/philo/phils/popper.html (last visited Sept. 
24, 2008). 
 28 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 29 In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2005). 
 30 Id. 
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jury case normally means nothing more than that a jury, utilizing 
their common experience, is satisfied that it was more likely than not 
that an antecedent act was a substantial, and foreseeable, force in 
bringing about the injury complained of.  For example, if Mr. Pig 
built his house of straw and the wolf, after huffing and puffing, blew 
down the house and ate Mrs. Pig, the estate of Mrs. Pig could sue, not 
just the wolf, but also Mr. Pig, because a reasonable jury of pigs might 
conclude that a substantial and foreseeable result of building a house 
of straw in the wild Grimm woods is that it won’t withstand the preda-
tory tendencies of ravenous wolves. 
But no typical juror is in a position to evaluate from common 
experience whether ephedra can cause strokes or heart attacks, so, if 
a plaintiff is to prevail, he must offer scientific testimony that, as a 
general matter, ephedra can cause strokes or heart attacks, and that it 
actually did so in his case.  The first kind of evidence is called evi-
dence of “general causation” and the second kind of evidence is 
called evidence of “specific causation,” but in both instances we are 
talking about scientific causation, not legal causation, that is, that 
there is a basis on which the scientific community applying scientific 
standards would conclude that causation had been established.  
Without evidence of both general causation and specific causation, 
there is no way a plaintiff in a toxic tort case can even get to a jury, let 
alone prevail. 
Regarding general causation, how would one establish as a scien-
tific matter that ephedra can cause strokes or heart attacks?  From a 
purely scientific standpoint, one way, not perfect but good, might be 
to select two sufficiently large random samples of people, give 
ephedra to one group and not to the other, and see if any people in 
the first group promptly experienced heart attacks or strokes.  Even 
proponents of torture might, however, feel some qualms about this 
approach.  However, fewer qualms might be felt if the experiment 
was performed on rats, rather than humans; but then the issues 
would be, among other things, are the doses of ephedra given to rats 
sufficiently comparable to those taken by humans—and are the 
physiological mechanisms of rats sufficiently like those of humans—
that one can meaningfully extrapolate from the rat results to the hu-
man experience? 
In some situations, where there is enough historical data avail-
able, there is another alternative, the so-called “epidemiological case-
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control study.”31  Going backward in time, one attempts to compare 
those consumers of ephedra who suffered strokes and heart attacks 
with other consumers of ephedra and with non-consumers of 
ephedra, using so-called “regression analysis” to separate out so-called 
“confounding factors.”32  This always leads to a publishable article 
filled with fancy mathematics and lots of jargon; but it actually in-
volves a certain amount of guesswork and speculation.  Still, when 
done very carefully, an epidemiological study has a high degree of ac-
ceptance within the scientific community and is likely to meet the re-
quirements of Rule 702. 
In the case of ephedra, however, no definitive epidemiological 
study had been done.  To understand why is also to understand why 
science and law cannot be viewed in isolation of one another in a 
given case.  To undertake an epidemiological study that is sufficiently 
rigorous to be scientifically persuasive requires a lot of time and 
money.  In the case of ephedra, such a study would have cost a mil-
lion dollars or more.  Pharmaceutical companies who must obtain 
FDA approval before they can market their drugs will often under-
write such studies, either by themselves or by universities, as a cost of 
obtaining such approval.  But, in the case of ephedra, Congress, some 
years before ephedra was marketed, had passed a law—basically at the 
behest of certain special interests—that exempted from prior FDA 
approval the marketing of “natural” substances like ephedra.33  As a 
result, none of the manufacturers of ephedra had had the slightest 
motive to fund an epidemiological study, and none had done so. 
On the other hand, the FDA still had the power to ban ephedra 
sales once it determined that ephedra was risky; but the legal stan-
dard for the FDA’s acting in such situations was much lower than that 
required to prove causation—for the obvious reason that, where 
health is concerned, the mere threat of a risk of heart attacks and 
strokes may require swift action, especially where, as in the case of 
ephedra, there is no counterbalancing health need for the drug.  But 
once the FDA banned ephedra, there was little incentive for a univer-
sity or public interest group to fund an expensive epidemiological 
 31 For a brief explanation of what an epidemiological case-control study is, see 
Susan Lewallen & Paul Courtright, Epidemiology in Practice: Case-Control Studies, 11 J. 
CMTY. EYE HEALTH 57 (1998), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ 
articlerender.fcgi?artid=1706071. 
 32 See id. 
 33 Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 
108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (amending the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, which 
amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). 
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study of ephedra’s causal effects, since the immediate problem had 
been removed. 
The net of this was that, in applying Rule 702 in the context of 
the Ephedra Litigation, I had to take account of the fact that the 
“best evidence” of causality, an epidemiological study, was, through 
neither side’s fault, simply not available.  The issue I was therefore 
presented with, so far as general causation was concerned, was 
whether, in the absence of an epidemiological study, plaintiffs’ ex-
perts could still satisfy scientific standards sufficiently to allow them to 
testify that ephedra could cause heart attacks and strokes. 
After a two-week evidentiary hearing at which numerous well-
credentialed scientists testified, and after a review of the relevant sci-
entific literature (some of which was hard slogging), I concluded 
that, on the one hand, none of plaintiffs’ experts would be permitted 
to testify “within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that 
ephedra causes heart attacks or strokes; but that, on the other hand, 
some of plaintiffs’ experts would be permitted to testify (based on 
animal studies, analogous human studies, plausible theories of the 
mechanisms involved, and much else) that there is a reliable basis to 
believe that ephedra may be a contributing cause of cardiac injury 
and strokes in people with high blood pressure, certain serious heart 
conditions, or a genetic sensitivity to ephedra—provided that such 
experts qualify their testimony with the acknowledgment that none of 
this has been the subject of definitive study and may yet be disproved. 
As you will recognize, this was something of a compromise; but it 
represented my attempt to accommodate the standards of Rule 702 
to the practical realities of the situation, as well as to protect the jury 
from being misled without unduly restricting its fact-finding role.  
The compromise was sufficient for immediate purposes; shortly after 
my decision came down, most of the 800 cases settled, for amounts 
that seemingly reflected the mid-point nature of what I allowed in the 
way of expert testimony.  But to suggest that it is easy for any judge to 
assess these kinds of complicated questions would be foolish.  On the 
other hand, I am frank to suggest that the Supreme Court is right in 
believing that this balancing of scientific reliability and legal admissi-
bility is better left to judges than to juries, administrators, or even sci-
entific panels, if only because no jury can reasonably be expected to 
undertake the kind of weeks-long inquiry necessary to determine 
threshold reliability and because judges have less of an ideological in-
terest in the outcome than most administrators or even most scien-
tific panels. 
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The real point I want to stress, however, is that the kinds of diffi-
culties I faced in being the scientific gatekeeper in the Ephedra Liti-
gation is small potatoes compared with what I and other federal 
judges are likely to face in the next few years as the law comes ever 
more tightly to grips with determining what is, and what is not, good 
science.  For example, there are already major challenges being 
raised to the admissibility of so-called “forensic science.”  All that stuff 
you see on CSI may seem imbued with the aura of good, scientific de-
tective work; but that aura is just the problem.  In actuality, the scien-
tific underpinnings of fingerprint analysis, hair analysis, and many 
other staples of “forensic science” are seemingly quite suspect, and 
when it comes to handwriting analysis there is already something of 
an emerging consensus that it cannot qualify as science at all.34
On the other hand, there are all kinds of new scientific tech-
niques that are pushing for acceptance in the courtroom.  Just last 
year, for example, the MacArthur Foundation gave $10 million dol-
lars to study the impact on the law of the fast-developing discipline 
called neuroscience,35 which, in a nutshell, is the science of how the 
brain works, as revealed, most especially, by brain scans.36  My per-
sonal view is that most of neuroscience, though promising, is as yet 
too undeveloped to pass the standards of Rule 702; but some of it is 
not that far away from becoming admissible. 
Science generally is so dynamic that issues of admissibility will 
require repeated reassessment over time.  For example, DNA testing 
for presence at the scene of the crime is clearly well established, both 
scientifically and legally.  But just recently The Washington Post carried 
an article about attempts by lawyers to introduce “DNA” evidence 
that their clients, or their adversaries, carry genes that are allegedly 
correlated with various genetic predispositions, ranging from suscep-
tibility to various diseases to tendencies toward violence.37  Although 
dressed up as DNA tests, the heart of these submissions really goes to 
 34 As an example of the limitations now being placed on traditional forensic sci-
ence, see my recent opinion in United States v. Glynn, 06 Cr. 580 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 22, 
2008), holding that ballistics comparisons are too subjective to qualify as a science 
and may be admitted in evidence only in limited respects. 
 35 Press Release, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, New $10 
Million MacArthur Project Integrates Law and Neuroscience (Oct. 9, 2007),  
available at http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org/Neurolaw%20Press%20 
ReleaseFINAL.pdf. 
 36 Although I am an (uncompensated) member of the governing board of the 
MacArthur Project, the views here stated are simply my personal views. 
 37 Rick Weiss, DNA Tests Offer Deeper Examination of Accused, WASH. POST, April 20, 
2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2008/04/19/AR2008041902225_pf.html. 
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the validity and reliability of the putative causal relationships between 
the presence of certain genes and the alleged effects on their carri-
ers.  The science bearing on this supposed causal relationship is, in 
many instances, neither validated, nor predictive, nor peer reviewed, 
nor error assessed, nor generally accepted; in many cases, it is 
unlikely to pass muster under Rule 702 except among jurists who are 
so overwhelmed by the difficulty of melding science with the law that 
they simply throw up their hands and, as the saying goes, “let it in for 
what it is worth.”  That would be a recipe for confusion that, I fear, 
would enhance neither the reputation of science nor the administra-
tion of true justice. 
In short, science and law remain uncomfortable bedfellows; but 
twin beds are not an option.  We may expect, therefore, that, jumbled 
together, they will toss and turn for a long time to come. 
